کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5034380 1471623 2017 9 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Research paperAn experimental investigation of rating-market regulation
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
یک تحقیق تجربی مقاله پژوهشی از قوانین بازار ارز
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی


- Repeated CRA-issuer interaction is examined in a simple experimental game.
- CRAs have an incentive to build a reputation for leniency.
- Issuers and CRAs frequently cooperate at the detriment of naïve clients.
- Regulation requesting issuers' up-front payment of rating fees is doomed to fail.

We introduce a simple game-theoretical model that captures the main aspects of the repeated interaction between an issuer and a credit-rating agency. It involves up-front payments of issuer fees and direct publication of requested ratings. Due to pecuniary injuries for untruthful ratings, the credit-rating agency should always report truthfully in the subgame perfect equilibrium. Knowing this, the issuer should never request a rating. Conducting laboratory experiments, we find that behavior significantly deviates from the equilibrium prediction in favor of a cooperative solution: issuers frequently do request ratings, which is often reciprocated with untruthful good ratings.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 144, December 2017, Pages 78-86
نویسندگان
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