کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5058242 | 1476618 | 2016 | 4 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
- We re-examine the Nash bargaining solution in vertical relations.
- âWe assume that up- and downstream firms bargain over a linear input price.
- We show that the profit sharing rule is given by a simple and instructive formula.
- We highlight the role of the elasticity of derived demand.
We re-examine the Nash bargaining solution when an upstream and N downstream firms bargain over a linear input price with unobservable contracts. We show that the profit sharing rule is given by a simple and instructive formula which depends on the parties' disagreement payoffs, the profit weights in the Nash-product and the elasticity of derived demand. A downstream firm's profit share increases in the equilibrium derived demand elasticity which in turn depends on the final goods' demand elasticity.
Journal: Economics Letters - Volume 145, August 2016, Pages 291-294