کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5069960 | 1373225 | 2009 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Impact of heterogeneous managerial productivity on executive hedge markets in an asymmetric information environment
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
Using the standard principal-agent framework, we show that the existence of executives with different levels of productivity introduces a so-far-unexplored channel through which managerial effort incentives are sustained in a setting in which executives are allowed to trade away their stock-based compensation. Due to the presence of asymmetric information, high-productivity executives end up diversifying away a smaller fraction of their performance-based compensation than they would under perfect information or if they were the only type of executive in the market. As a result, they exert a higher effort level in equilibrium and thereby increase the value of the firm relative to the uniform productivity case, thus bringing the results closer to the outcome observed in a model with no hedging.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Finance Research Letters - Volume 6, Issue 4, December 2009, Pages 187-201
Journal: Finance Research Letters - Volume 6, Issue 4, December 2009, Pages 187-201
نویسندگان
Stefan Avdjiev, Zheng Zeng,