کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072998 | 1373527 | 2007 | 21 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
A global game with strategic substitutes and complements
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We study a global game in which actions are strategic complements over some region and strategic substitutes over another region. An agent's payoff depends on a market fundamental and the actions of other agents. If the degree of congestion is sufficiently large, agents' strategies are non-monotonic in their signal about the market fundamental. In this case, a signal that makes them believe that the market fundamental is more favorable for an action may make them less likely to take the action, because of the risk of overcrowding.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 60, Issue 1, July 2007, Pages 155-175
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 60, Issue 1, July 2007, Pages 155-175
نویسندگان
Larry Karp, In Ho Lee, Robin Mason,