کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5078024 | 1477331 | 2012 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Collusion in experimental Bertrand duopolies with convex costs: The role of cost asymmetry
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Theory, experimental studies, as well as antitrust guidelines suggest that symmetry among firms is conducive to more collusive outcomes. We test this perception in a series of experimental repeated Bertrand duopolies where firms have convex costs. We implement symmetric as well as asymmetric markets that vary in their degree of cost asymmetry among firms. We find no evidence of symmetric markets being more prone to collusion than asymmetric markets. If anything, asymmetry helps firms coordinate on higher prices and achieve higher profits.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 30, Issue 6, November 2012, Pages 508-517
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 30, Issue 6, November 2012, Pages 508-517
نویسندگان
Cédric Argenton, Wieland Müller,