کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5090528 | 1375635 | 2009 | 9 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Governance quality and privately negotiated stock repurchases: Evidence of agency conflict
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
This study examines the impact of shareholder rights on the wealth effects of privately negotiated stock repurchases. Our results show that wealth gains are lower when shareholder rights are more suppressed. We also find that the premium paid for shares is inversely related to the strength of shareholder rights, and this suggests that managers pay higher premiums when shareholder rights are more restricted. These findings imply that managers use shareholders' funds to eliminate blockholders who are more likely to monitor them when shareholder rights are relatively weak, thereby entrench themselves. Consistent with this view, we further show that significant positive abnormal long-run returns after private stock repurchases are limited to firms with stronger shareholder protection. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the predictions of agency theory.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 33, Issue 2, February 2009, Pages 317-325
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 33, Issue 2, February 2009, Pages 317-325
نویسندگان
Oneil Harris, Charmaine Glegg,