کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5100480 1377224 2017 17 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Ambiguity and the corporation: Group disagreement and underinvestment
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
ابهام و شرکت: عدم توافق گروهی و کم سرمایه گذاری
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری حسابداری
چکیده انگلیسی
We study a dynamic corporate investment problem where decisions have to be made collectively by a group of agents holding heterogeneous beliefs and adhering to a “utilitarian” governance mechanism in which each agent has a given influence in the decision. In this setting we show that: (i) group decisions are typically dynamically inconsistent, (ii) dynamic inconsistency leads to inefficient underinvestment, and (iii) the ability to trade securities among insiders or with outsiders may restore efficient investment decisions but it may, in some cases, lead to inefficient overinvestment. Our theory can help explain the empirical evidence on the effect of diversity of groups, such as corporate boards, on firms' outcomes and, more generally, on the difference between group and individual behavior.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 125, Issue 3, September 2017, Pages 417-433
نویسندگان
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