|کد مقاله||کد نشریه||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||نسخه تمام متن|
|5127066||1378540||2017||21 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||دانلود کنید|
- A Lagrange traffic model allows representation of energy consumption and collision risk.
- An auction-based protocol allows decentralized conflict resolution.
- Auction bid valuation is based on fuel heuristic which balances safety and efficiency.
- Cooperative conflict resolution achieves more equity than non-cooperative.
- Centralized solution minimizes collective cost but has more inequity.
This paper presents a study on how cooperation versus non-cooperation, and centralization versus distribution impact the performance of a traffic game of autonomous vehicles. A model using a particle-based, Lagrange representation, is developed, instead of an Eulerian, flow-based one, usual in routing problems of the game-theoretical approach. This choice allows representation of phenomena such as fuel exhaustion, vehicle collision, and wave propagation. The elements necessary to represent interactions in a multi-agent transportation system are defined, including a distributed, priority-based resource allocation protocol, where resources are nodes and links in a spatial network and individual routing strategies are performed. A fuel consumption dynamics is developed in order to account for energy cost and vehicles having limited range. The analysis shows that only the scenarios with cooperative resource allocation can achieve optimal values of either collective cost or equity coefficient, corresponding respectively to the centralized and to the distributed cases.
Journal: Transportation Research Part B: Methodological - Volume 96, February 2017, Pages 92-112