کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
6481253 1377580 2017 17 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Collateral-based in SME lending: The role of business collateral and personal collateral in less-developed countries
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
مبتنی بر وثیقه در اعطای وام SME: نقش وثیقه کسب و کار و وثیقه شخصی در کشورهای کمتر توسعه یافته
کلمات کلیدی
وام های SME؛ وثیقه شخصی؛ وثیقه تجاری؛ سطح وثیقه شخصی و تجاری؛ کشورهای کمتر توسعه یافته
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری کسب و کار و مدیریت بین المللی
چکیده انگلیسی


- This paper extends empirical evidence on the determinants; of the incidence of business and personal collateral for SMEs in less-developed countries.
- The findings endorse the importance of producing and sharing private information between lenders to reduce informational asymmetries.
- The results suggest that market concentration increases lazy behavior of banks by asking for collateral not to mitigate observable risk but to reduce screening efforts.
- The results indicate that reforms pertaining to the information-sharing instruments by public credit registries have practical effects on mitigating credit constraints and reducing collateral requirements.
- Using a continuation ratio model, this study uncovers several differences in the determinants of the collateralization decision and the type of collateral provided.

Using a database of banking credit approvals for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operating in less-developed countries throughout Eastern Europe and Central Asia, this paper extends empirical evidence on the determinants of the incidence and the levels of business and personal collateral, reporting first-hand results regarding the impact of the recently reformed credit environment on collateral requirements. The findings endorse the importance of producing and sharing private information between lenders to reduce informational asymmetries and, consequently, the need to provide collateral to receive a loan. The results also suggest that market concentration increases “lazy” behavior on behalf of banks in the form of asking for collateral not to mitigate observable risk but rather to reduce screening efforts.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Research in International Business and Finance - Volume 39, Part A, January 2017, Pages 406-422
نویسندگان
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