کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7353029 | 1477050 | 2018 | 18 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Speculation under unawareness
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
“No trade” theorems establish that, in various trading environments, investors who share a common prior will not engage in speculation, as long as expected utility, Bayesian updating and full awareness are imposed. We relax the last assumption by allowing for asymmetric unawareness and examine under which conditions speculative behaviour emerges. We find that if common knowledge is assumed (as in the settings of Aumann, 1976 and Milgrom and Stokey, 1982), unawareness cannot generate speculation. This is not true, however, in settings where no common knowledge is assumed, such as speculation in equilibrium (Geanakoplos, 1989) and betting that is always beneficial (Morris, 1994), unless stronger conditions on awareness are imposed.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 109, May 2018, Pages 598-615
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 109, May 2018, Pages 598-615
نویسندگان
Spyros Galanis,