کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
884560 | 912399 | 2006 | 21 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
All-pay auctions—an experimental study
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper reports the results of a repeated all-pay auction game. The auction form used is the simplest possible, complete information, perfect recall and common value. Our main findings are that in such an auction, over-bidding is quite drastic, and the seller's revenue depends strongly on the number of bidders in early stages. However, after a few rounds of play, this dependence completely disappears and the seller's revenue becomes independent of the number of participants. The results are confronted with two solution concepts of economic theory, the Nash-equilibrium and the symmetric Logit equilibrium.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 61, Issue 2, October 2006, Pages 255–275
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 61, Issue 2, October 2006, Pages 255–275
نویسندگان
Uri Gneezy, Rann Smorodinsky,