کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
959734 | 929356 | 2010 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Unstable banking
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
We propose a theory of financial intermediaries operating in markets influenced by investor sentiment. In our model, banks make, securitize, distribute, and trade loans, or they hold cash. They also borrow money, using their security holdings as collateral. Banks maximize profits, and there are no conflicts of interest between bank shareholders and creditors. The theory predicts that bank credit and real investment will be volatile when market prices of loans are volatile, but it also points to the instability of banks, especially leveraged banks, participating in markets. Profit-maximizing behavior by banks creates systemic risk.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 97, Issue 3, September 2010, Pages 306–318
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 97, Issue 3, September 2010, Pages 306–318
نویسندگان
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny,