کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
972774 | 932681 | 2011 | 19 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
High levels of employment protection reduce hiring and firing and have a theoretically ambiguous effect on the employment level. Immigrants, being new to the labor market, may be less aware of employment protection regulations and less likely to claim their rights, which may create a gap between the costs for employers of hiring a native relative to hiring an immigrant. This paper tests that hypothesis drawing on evidence for the EU and on two natural experiments for Spain and Italy. The results suggest that strict employment protection legislation (EPL) gives immigrants a comparative advantage relative to natives. Stricter EPL is found to reduce employment and reduce hiring and firing rates for natives. By contrast, stricter EPL has a much smaller effect on immigrants.
Research Highlights
► I examine the differential effect of employment protection on immigrants and natives.
► Stricter employment protection reduces employment, hiring and firing for natives.
► By contrast, stricter employment protection has a much smaller effect on immigrants.
Journal: Labour Economics - Volume 18, Issue 5, October 2011, Pages 624–642