کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
983610 | 934038 | 2009 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Strategic managerial dishonesty and financial distress
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper analyzes the effect of stricter sanctions against fraudulent disclosure in an economy where commercial lenders have only an imperfect information about the type of the firm they trade with. In the hybrid Bayesian equilibrium, some managers running fragile firms claim that their firm is solid only to benefit of better commercial credit terms. The default premium charged by the supplier over the normal cost can be interpreted here as an indirect bankruptcy cost. When the sanction gets heavier, both the default premium and the frequency of defaulting firms go up. Under given circumstances, these perverse effects might be offset by a decline in direct bankruptcy costs.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Research in Economics - Volume 63, Issue 1, March 2009, Pages 11-21
Journal: Research in Economics - Volume 63, Issue 1, March 2009, Pages 11-21
نویسندگان
Damien Besancenot, Radu Vranceanu,