Bank regulation, financial crisis, and the announcement effects of seasoned equity offerings of US commercial banks

• We find higher stock abnormal returns upon bank seasoned equity offerings than non-banks using the U.S. bank sample.
• It is suggested that bank regulations reduce the likelihood that bank SEOs signal overpriced equity.
• This difference changes after changes of financial conditions and bank regulations

This paper studies the differences in the announcement effects of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) of commercial banks and non-banks, and explores the influence of bank regulation and the financial crisis on such differences. We find that abnormal stock returns on SEO announcements for US commercial banks are significantly higher than those of non-banks, consistent with the hypothesis that bank regulations reduce the likelihood that bank SEOs signal overpriced equity. The propensity score matching-based difference-in-difference analysis indicates that the differences in stock returns between banks and non-banks decreased during the 2007–2009 financial crisis period and increased after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.