کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
480612 | 1446087 | 2012 | 8 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
Two manufacturers produce substitutable goods for a homogeneous market. The advertising efforts of the two manufacturers determine the demand for the goods and interfere negatively with each other. The demand of each good is a piecewise linear function of the product goodwill, and the latter is a linear function of advertising efforts. In a game with two competing profit-maximizing manufacturers who have access to a set of several advertising media, the pure-strategy Nash equilibria are characterized and their existence is shown.
► We model two competing manufacturers who provide a market with substitutable goods.
► Advertising efforts determine demand and interfere negatively with each other.
► A two-player continuous game with non-smooth payoff functions.
► We characterize and prove existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria of game.
► Each manufacturer uses only one advertising medium in equilibrium.
Journal: European Journal of Operational Research - Volume 216, Issue 3, 1 February 2012, Pages 605–612