کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7352945 | 1477051 | 2018 | 9 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Is Shapley cost sharing optimal?
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
آیا شاپلی هزینه به اشتراک گذاری بهینه است؟
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
A general approach to the design of budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms is to use the Shapley value, applied to the given cost function, to define payments from the players to the mechanism. Is the corresponding Shapley value mechanism “optimal” in some sense? We consider the objective of minimizing worst-case inefficiency subject to a revenue constraint, and prove results in three different regimes. First, for the public excludable good problem, the Shapley value mechanism minimizes the worst-case efficiency loss over all truthful, deterministic, and budget-balanced mechanisms that satisfy equal treatment. Second, even with randomization and approximate budget-balance allowed and dropping equal treatment, the worst-case efficiency loss of the Shapley value mechanism is within a constant factor of the minimum possible. Third, for no-deficit mechanisms, we prove a general positive result: for every monotone cost function, a suitable blend of the VCG and Shapley value mechanisms is no-deficit and enjoys good approximate efficiency guarantees.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 108, March 2018, Pages 130-138
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 108, March 2018, Pages 130-138
نویسندگان
Shahar Dobzinski, Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan,