Choice architecture in conflicts of interest: Defaults as physical and psychological barriers to (dis)honesty

• We explore the role defaults versus no defaults can play in encouraging morality.
• Cheating is easier when it requires accepting a default, wrong answer.
• Cheating is harder when it requires overriding a default, correct answer.
• People have correct intuitions about how defaults affect cheating.
• People expect no difference in moral character to commit either type of cheating.

Default options significantly influence individuals' tendencies to comply with public policy goals such as organ donation. We extend that notion and explore the role defaults can play in encouraging (im)moral conduct in two studies. Building on previous research into omission and commission we show that individuals cheat most when it requires passively accepting a default, incorrect answer (Omission). More importantly, despite equivalent physical effort, individuals cheat less when it requires overriding a default, correct answer (Super-commission) than when simply giving an incorrect answer (Commission) — because the former is psychologically harder. Furthermore, while people expect physical and psychological costs to influence cheating, they do not believe that it takes a fundamentally different moral character to overcome either cost. Our findings support a more nuanced perspective on the implication of the different types of costs associated with default options and offer practical insights for policy, such as taxation, to nudge honesty.