کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
969306 | 1479468 | 2011 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes](/preview/png/969306.png)
The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support the provision of public goods has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable of either resolving or exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. We find that cooperative orientation, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting.
Research Highlights
► We study linear public goods games with formal sanctions schemes.
► Subjects determine sanctions scheme parameters by voting.
► Almost all groups learn to select efficiency-inducing parameters.
► Cooperative orientation, gender and intelligence influence individuals' votes.
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 95, Issues 9–10, October 2011, Pages 1213–1222