کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
969366 | 1479469 | 2011 | 14 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
In spite of the large expected costs of needing long-term care, only 10–12% of the elderly population has private insurance coverage. Medicaid, which provides means-tested public assistance and pays for almost half of long-term care costs, spends more than $100 billion annually on long-term care. In this paper, I exploit variation in the adoption and generosity of state tax subsidies for private long-term care insurance to determine whether tax subsidies increase private coverage and reduce Medicaid's costs for long-term care. The results indicate that the average tax subsidy raises coverage rates by 2.7 percentage points, or 28%. However, the response is concentrated among high income and asset-rich individuals, populations with low probabilities of relying on Medicaid. Simulations suggest each dollar of state tax expenditure produces approximately $0.84 in Medicaid savings, over half of which funnels to the federal government.
Research Highlights
► Tax subsidies for private long-term care insurance were implemented to promote coverage and reduce Medicaid expenditures for long-term care.
► The presence of tax subsidies increases coverage rates by 2.7 percentage points, or 28%.
► The response is concentrated among high income and asset-rich individuals.
► Simulations suggest each dollar of state tax expenditure produces approximately $0.84 in Medicaid savings.
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 95, Issues 7–8, August 2011, Pages 744–757