کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
970059 1479478 2010 12 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Strategic delegation and voting rules
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Strategic delegation and voting rules
چکیده انگلیسی

The selection of political representatives depends on the political system. Principals, such as voters or districts, may benefit by strategically electing representatives different from themselves. While a status-quo biased delegate may be a better negotiator, an enthusiastic representative has a better chance of being included in the majority coalition. A larger majority requirement leads to “conservative” delegation and hence a status quo bias; a poor minority protection does the opposite. Through strategic delegation, the political system also determines whether centralization or decentralization is beneficial.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 94, Issues 1–2, February 2010, Pages 102–113
نویسندگان
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