Locating and protecting facilities from intentional attacks using secrecy

- Present a multi-objective optimization approach for facility location problem to consider intentional attacks.
- Describe a simultaneous game for facility protection under secrecy of information.
- Prove secrecy to be better than truthful disclosure of information.
- Present an approach for solving the proposed simultaneous game.
- Use Swain dataset and London dataset as illustration of the proposed approach.

To preserve continued effective performance of facilities, their protection against intentional attacks needs to be considered while determining optimal facility location solutions. We propose a simultaneous game between a defender and an attacker to study facility protection against intentional attacks while keeping the information about protection resource allocation secret. To deal with the complexity of solving the proposed simultaneous game, we employ an algorithm with necessary adaptations to identify its mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium solution, which is used to evaluate the disruption inflicted by intentional attacks on the efficiency of a facility location solution. The facility location problem with protection against intentional attacks is then modeled as a multi-objective optimization problem, in order to balance the cost of opening facilities and the efficiency of facilities with and without facility failures inflicted by intentional attacks. MO-PSDA, a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm, is employed to solve the proposed multi-objective optimization problem.