کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
972325 | 932560 | 2008 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
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موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
We consider economies with a single indivisible good and money. We study the possibility of constructing strategy-proof, symmetric, and budget balanced mechanisms. We show three impossibility results on restricted domains: there is no strategy-proof, symmetric, and budget balanced mechanism satisfying either (i) equal compensation, (ii) normal compensation, or (iii) individual rationality. Moreover, the first result is strengthened by replacing symmetry with weak symmetry. In contrast, we show that our sequential mechanisms satisfy strategy-proofness, weak symmetry, budget balance, and the other three axioms on much more restricted domains.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 55, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 14–23
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 55, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 14–23
نویسندگان
Kazutoshi Ando, Miki Kato, Shinji Ohseto,