Axiomatizations of the Owen value without efficiency

In this work we employ a simple axiom to provide three characterizations of the Owen value [Owen, G., 1977. Values of games with a priori unions. In: Henn, R., Moeschlin, O. (Eds.), Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems. Essays in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern. Springer Verlag, Nueva York, pp. 76­88] without efficiency which are related to Owen's, Hart and Kurz's [Hart, S., Kurz, M., 1983. Endogenous formation of coalitions. Econometrica 51, 1047­1064] and Peleg's [Peleg, B., 1989. Introduction to the theory of cooperative games chapter 8 the Shapley value. RM 88 Center for Research in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory. The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel] characterizations of the Owen value.