Le sang : un grand oublié de l'éthique des soins

I do not advocate the necessity to substitute at once the gratuitousness of the donation for the payment of the blood's collect. My feeling being rather in favour of gratuitousness, I only want to consider the arguments used to establish one prescription or the other, one proscription or the other, this or that rule. In that way, I am led, neither to stray from the common evaluations, nor to assume sceptical positions, indefensible in practical questions, but to dispute pretended arguments that falsified by wrong reasons intuitions that could have been right (though ill-founded). It is clear that the ethics of person is not able, alone, to think the question of blood donation; it is no less clear that the former is meant to be more rational than the archaic exchanges we recognize in surrounding religions, but also that the ethics of person is absolutely impotent, in spite of those who pretend to derive from it ethical positions that prove to be contradictory. As a result, on this matter, the only consistent ethical position that takes in account the swings pro and con bends to a rationalization from behind of fundamentally irrational positions that have all the characteristics of taboos. It is not impossible that a part of the ethics could not do without a Hebraic, Greek, Christian mythic to which the apparent rationalizations of the « person » give a more respectable look to the eyes of people that are fancying an idea of reason, though it could not be enough to constitute the mover of ethics if it were alone.