کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5099068 | 1376982 | 2009 | 20 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Could myopic pricing be a strategic choice in marketing channels? A game theoretic analysis
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
کنترل و بهینه سازی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
We identify the conditions under which a myopic pricing behavior could be a profit enhancing tool in the distribution channel. A channel member is myopic when he ignores the evolution of the retail prices when actual and past retail prices affect consumers' purchasing decisions. A differential game is formulated where channel members control transfer and retail prices. We start by examining a bilateral monopoly, and then introduce competition at the manufacturing level. The competing manufacturers play à la Nash and can be both myopic, both farsighted, or one myopic while the other is farsighted. We show that, for a bilateral monopoly, myopia enhances total channel profit when the effect of the reference price is small enough. This remains true under competition at the manufacturing level when products are differentiated enough.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control - Volume 33, Issue 9, September 2009, Pages 1699-1718
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control - Volume 33, Issue 9, September 2009, Pages 1699-1718
نویسندگان
Hassan Benchekroun, Guiomar MartÃn-Herrán, Sihem Taboubi,