Keywords: D86; Insurance; Adverse selection; Duopoly; Contracts; Nash equilibrium;
مقالات ISI ترجمه شده
Keywords: E44; E32; D82; D86; G01; G32; Two-sided financial frictions; Systemic risk; Financial crisis;
مقالات ISI (ترجمه نشده)
مقالات زیر هنوز به فارسی ترجمه نشده اند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
Keywords: D82; D83; D86; Optimal contracts; Information disclosure; Bayesian persuasion;
Keywords: D86; D82; D81; H11; C61; Q54; Climate change; Public-private partnership; Adaptation; Energy efficiency;
Keywords: Network externalities; Peer effects; Mechanism design; Group design; Screening; D82; D85; D86;
Keywords: D81; D82; D86; Moral hazard; Non-probabilistic uncertainty; Ambiguity aversion; Implementability;
Keywords: D86; K31; M52; J33; J79; Contracts; Employer liability; Moral hazard; Incomplete information;
Keywords: C72; C92; D86; Equilibrium selection; Passive beliefs; Symmetric beliefs; Vertical contracting; Multiple equilibria; Imperfect information;
Keywords: D22; D86; G30; K12; M41; Contract enforceability; Non-compete covenants; Discretionary investment; Financial reporting;
Keywords: D86; D82; C72; C92; Moral hazard; Hidden action; Contract theory; Incentive theory; Laboratory experiments;
Keywords: D82; D86; D42; Dynamic adverse selection; Mechanism design; Price-posting;
Keywords: D82; D86; G24; G28; Performance-based payment; Project evaluation; Credit rating agency; Rating inflation; Information accuracy;
Keywords: D86; F34; H63; Sovereign lending; Default; Dynamic contracting;
Keywords: Expectation-based loss aversion; Specialization; Multitasking; Implementation; Complementarities; J41; J24; D21; D03; D86; D90; J33;
Keywords: Coasian contracting; Negative externalities; Hidden information; Limited liability; Overproduction; D86; D82; D23; D62; H23;
Keywords: Communication; Relational contracting; Experimental economics; C91; D83; D86; L14;
Keywords: C61; C73; D86; D91; L14; Relational contracts; Self-enforcement; Limited commitment; Risk sharing;
Keywords: D20; D86; K40; Double-sided moral hazard; Task misallocation; Judicial organization; Production of judicial services;
Keywords: D82; D86; Mechanism design; Robust mechanism design; Dominant-strategy mechanisms; Maxmin foundation; Linear programming; Duality approach;
Keywords: D86; D90; J33; Fixed wages; Deferred incentives; Dynamic moral hazard; Expectation-based reference-dependent preferences; Loss aversion;
Keywords: Credence goods; Non-observable treatments; Hidden information; Moral hazard; Limited liability; D82; D83; D86; I11;
Keywords: D82; D84; D86; G21; O16; C72; Contract enforcement; Default spillovers; Credit crunch; Credit cycles; Global games; Heterogeneity;
Keywords: D82; D86; G32; Investment; Bilateral insurance; Private information; Contracts;
Keywords: Procurement; Monitoring; Innovation partnership; Dynamic contracts; D82; D86; H57;
Keywords: Executive compensation; Limited liability; Options; Risk management; Relative performance evaluation; D86; G32; G34; J33;
Keywords: C78; D03; D86; Behavioral contract theory; Expectation-based loss aversion; Hold-up problem; Incomplete contracts; Renegotiation;
Keywords: G11; G23; D86; Delegated asset management; Optimal contracting; Fund flows; Benchmarking; Credit ratings;
Keywords: D44; D47; D82; D86; Package auction; Equilibrium strategies; Spectrum auction; Market design;
Keywords: D61; D86; J20; J24; Specific human capital; Training; Learning-by-doing; Turnover; Productivity enhancement; Employee evaluation;
Keywords: D23; D86; C78; H41; L31; Transaction costs; Public goods; Property rights; Bargaining; Incomplete contracts;
Keywords: Operational research; Network economics; Variational inequality; Supply chain; Forest-based sector; C72; D85; D86; L11; L14; L73;
Keywords: Asymmetric information; Pecking-order theory; Signalling; Timing of earnings; D82; D86; G32;
Keywords: J33; J41; D86; J4; M52; M51; Self-selection; Contracting; Individual characteristics; Risk preferences; Psychological traits;
Keywords: D86; G34; M48; Optimal accounting regulation; Accrual-based earnings management; Real earnings management; Time inconsistency;
Keywords: Moral hazard; Adverse selection; Regulation; Simple contracts; D86; L51; L22;
Keywords: Moral hazard; Strategic decision-making; Career concerns; In-the-money stock-options; Tenure; D83; D86;
Keywords: D23; D86; C78; L24; O32; Property rights; Incomplete contracts; Investment incentives; Partnership dissolution; Shared ownership;
Keywords: Credit fluctuations; Macroprudential regulation; Sectoral misallocation of capital; G21; G28; D86;
Keywords: C73; C92; D03; D86; Outside options; Endogenous termination; Dissolution clauses; Imperfect public monitoring; Dynamic games;
Keywords: D23; D82; D86; Delegation; Organizational procedures; Money burning;
Keywords: D42; D82; D86; Dynamic contracting; Screening; Renegotiation;
Keywords: Information revelation; Hold-up; Property Right Theory; Shared ownership; D23; D82; D86;
Keywords: D86; F16; J31; L15; Quality of labour; Incomplete information; Incentive contract; International trade; Wage gap; Ricardian trade model;
Keywords: Agency; Entry threat; Strategic right; Termination; D86; L22; L24; O30;
Keywords: D23; D86; O32; C92; Property rights; Incomplete contracts; Investment incentives; Laboratory experiments;
Keywords: D82; D86; First-order approach; Moral hazard; Principal-agent models; Spanning condition;
Keywords: D82; D83; D86; Bayesian persuasion; Signaling; Information transmission;
Keywords: D23; D86; L22; Inertia; Reputation concerns; Monitoring; Intervention;
Keywords: D42; D86; L12; L42; All-units discounts; Retroactive rebates; Double marginalization; Double moral hazard; Partnerships; Teams;
Keywords: C72; C78; C92; D03; D86; Agreements; Negotiations; Communication; Temptation; Experiment; Game theory;