کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
1000171 936963 2012 12 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Regulatory capture and banking supervision reform
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و مالیه (عمومی)
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Regulatory capture and banking supervision reform
چکیده انگلیسی

We analyze whether banking supervision responsibilities should be concentrated in the hands of a single supervisor. We find that splitting supervisory powers among different supervisors is a superior arrangement in terms of social welfare to concentrating them in a single supervisor when the capture of supervisors by bankers is a concern. This result has implications for the design of banking supervisory architecture and informs current reform efforts in this field.


► We model banking supervision under the threat of capture by bankers.
► We study whether supervisory powers should be concentrated in a single supervisor.
► Concentration increases the likelihood of capture of the supervisor by bankers.
► Splitting supervisory powers is a superior arrangement in terms of social welfare.
► We provide a rationale for reconsidering the current trend toward concentration.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Stability - Volume 8, Issue 3, September 2012, Pages 206–217
نویسندگان
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