How can we explain internal auditing? The inadequacy of agency theory and a labor process alternative

This paper draws on labor process theory (LPT) to explain how capitalism creates conditions that give rise to a demand for internal auditing. Internal auditing developed from the metamorphosis of capitalism during the twentieth century, when capital gradually succeeded in institutionalizing structural control of labor processes to address the problem of control in inherently antagonistic capital-labor relationships. In this control context employees, management, and the board of directors are responsible for achieving the required rate of return on capital. With the premise that the literature has not adequately theorized the role of internal auditing in this context, this paper proposes an initial theorization of the role of internal auditing as a mechanism employed by management and the board of directors to control the labor process in the generation and realization of surplus value. Internal audit's assurance services to execute business activities according to management's conceptions, and its advisory services to enhance efficiency and effectiveness, are interpreted within the firm's overarching goal of maximizing the rate of return on capital employed. Future research agenda and methodological considerations are discussed.