کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
1003186 | 937554 | 2010 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
This paper examines the relations between analyst forecast accuracy, forecast dispersion, analyst following and the quantity of governance disclosures in a global setting. I document that companies with more comprehensive corporate governance disclosures in annual reports have more accurate and less dispersed earnings forecasts from financial analysts. These findings indicate that analysts understand the implications of corporate governance for future cash flows. In addition to the improved quality of information released by financial analysts, I also find that disclosing more information on corporate governance attracts more financial analysts, thereby enhancing a firm's information environment. These findings underscore the benefits of disclosing information related to corporate governance practices for global firms.
Journal: Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation - Volume 19, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 1–15