Accruals quality and the incentive contracting role of earnings

This paper investigates the association between accruals quality and the usefulness of accounting earnings in incentive contracting. Accruals quality, which measures the precision with which accruals predict future cash flows, has two potential opposing effects on the noise in earnings as a measure of managerial performance. Specifically, higher quality accruals should decrease the deviations of earnings from future cash flows and increase the sensitivity of earnings to cash flows that are not attributable to managerial actions. My evidence indicates that better accruals quality is associated with a higher weight on earnings in compensation contracts, which suggests that accruals quality overall reduces the noise in earnings. I also find that the positive association between accruals quality and the weight on earnings is mainly driven by innate accruals quality rather than discretionary accruals quality. Therefore, accrual errors resulting from the volatility of the operating environment are a primary source of noise in earnings considered by compensation committees.