کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
1019616 | 940674 | 2009 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Bundling governance mechanisms to efficiently organize small firm loans
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
کسب و کار و مدیریت بین المللی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
Bank loans are a common source of financing for small firms. While scholars have examined specific conditions that affect small firm loan approval and interest rates, practical questions remain about how these loans are structured to address characteristically acute challenges from asymmetric information. This paper suggests collateral, reputation, and relationship banking each perform unique exchange-organizing tasks, and that small firms systematically use them in predictable combinations. A multiple discriminant analysis of 796 small firm loans suggests four governance bundles are commonly employed in this setting. The implications for managers focus on how loan governance mechanisms are most efficiently bundled together.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Business Venturing - Volume 24, Issue 2, March 2009, Pages 183–195
Journal: Journal of Business Venturing - Volume 24, Issue 2, March 2009, Pages 183–195
نویسندگان
Douglas A. Bosse,