کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
1031610 | 1483629 | 2016 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
Drawing on contract governance literature and institutional theory, this study investigates the differential effects of output- and behavior-based contract governance on buyer–supplier conflict in supply chains. The authors develop a contingent perspective to examine how institutional factors moderate the impact of contract governance. The findings, from an empirical study of buyer–supplier dyads in China, show that an output-based contract is negatively, whereas a behavior-based contract is positively, related to buyer–supplier conflict. The effects of a contract are moderated by two primary institutional factors: legal enforceability and unilateral government support. These findings have important implications for supply chain research, public policy, and managerial practice.
Journal: Journal of Operations Management - Volume 41, January 2016, Pages 12–24