کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
1032609 1483680 2014 18 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Mean-risk analysis of radio frequency identification technology in supply chain with inventory misplacement: Risk-sharing and coordination
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
تجزیه و تحلیل میانگین خطر فن آوری شناسایی فرکانس رادیویی در زنجیره تامین با جابجایی موجودی: به اشتراک گذاری خطر و هماهنگی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری استراتژی و مدیریت استراتژیک
چکیده انگلیسی


• There exist a maximum tag cost and fixed cost for each agent to have incentive to adopt RFID.
• The manufacturer must assume more fixed cost if the retailer is more risk-averse.
• There exists a cost sharing ratio to align the agents’ incentives in decentralized case.
• The agents’ incentives will be aligned and independent of risk attitudes if the revenue sharing ratio equals cost sharing ratio.
• The more risk the manufacturer takes, the more feasible to achieve the channel coordination.

This paper investigates the application of radio frequency identification (RFID) technology to eliminate the misplacement problems in the supply chain, which consists of a risk-neutral manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer. By considering both fixed cost and tag cost of RFID implementation, we study the agents' incentives to adopt RFID in both uncoordinated and coordinated cases. We focus on analyzing the impact of risk attitudes on the agents’ incentives and on the supply chain coordination. The central semi-deviation is adopted to measure the retailer's risk attitude. In the uncoordinated case, we find that, in order to induce the retailer to adopt RFID, the manufacturer must assume more fixed cost if the retailer is more risk-averse. In the coordinated case, we first show that the standard revenue sharing contract does not always coordinate the channel. If the channel is coordinated, we observe that the agents’ incentives will be perfectly aligned and independent of the risk attitudes, if the revenue sharing ratio equals the fixed cost sharing ratio. Then we propose a risk-sharing contract that offers the risk protection to the retailer, to achieve the channel coordination. An interesting finding is that the manufacturer's incentive will not decrease with the tag cost, if she takes much risk from the retailer. The corresponding impacts of RFID adoption on the two contracts are also analyzed in this paper. Finally, a case study in a tobacco industry is presented to show the real RFID cost in practice.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Omega - Volume 46, July 2014, Pages 86–103
نویسندگان
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