کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
10368404 874731 2005 27 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Privatization, corporate control and regulatory reform: the case of Telefonica
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه مهندسی کامپیوتر سیستم های اطلاعاتی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Privatization, corporate control and regulatory reform: the case of Telefonica
چکیده انگلیسی
This study analyzes the interaction of agency problems in public policy and of agency problems inside the firm: it investigates the case of a large privatized firm subject to many policy constraints. The last steps of Telefonica's privatization were designed to promote a dispersed ownership and give managers a high level of discretion in running the company. This effectively created an agency problem inside the firm. There were no powerful shareholders to constrain the managers, and the threat of a takeover was not a credible one, since the government kept a golden share. There is no overall evidence of capture of politicians and regulators by managers in the interest of shareholders, although evidence suggests the existence of collusion between politicians and managers. The authors interpret the political interference with the firm's control (a well-documented phenomenon both in this study and in the cross-country literature on privatization; e.g. political ends in privatization, influence in appointments, golden shares) as the most visible part of such collusion. Liberalization and multi-level regulation will likely make any type of collusion or capture more difficult in the future.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Telecommunications Policy - Volume 29, Issue 1, February 2005, Pages 25-51
نویسندگان
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