کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
10437739 912424 2005 23 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Continuing conflict
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Continuing conflict
چکیده انگلیسی
A relatively small but growing literature in economics examines conflictive activities where agents allocate their resource endowments between wealth production and appropriation. To date, their studies have employed a one period, static game theoretic framework. We propose a methodology to extend this literature to a dynamic setting, modeling continuous conflict over renewable natural resources between two rival groups. Investigating the system's steady states and dynamics, we find two results of general interest. First, Hirshleifer's “paradox of power” is self-correcting. Second, if productive activities cause damage to disputed resources, the introduction of a small amount of conflictive activity enhances social welfare.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 58, Issue 1, September 2005, Pages 30-52
نویسندگان
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