کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10475407 | 929139 | 2005 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Non-compliance and the quota price in an ITQ fishery
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper examines the effects of non-compliance on quota demands and the equilibrium quota price in an ITQ fishery. I show that whereas lower quota prices are implied unambiguously by expected penalties which are a function of the absolute violation size, the expectation of penalties based upon relative violations of quota demands can, under certain conditions, produce higher quota prices than in a compliant quota market. If there are both compliant and non-compliant firms in the fishery, the result would then be a shift in quota demand from compliant to non-compliant firms, rather than the reverse. The findings are generally applicable to quota markets in other industries, including pollution permit markets.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management - Volume 49, Issue 3, May 2005, Pages 427-436
Journal: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management - Volume 49, Issue 3, May 2005, Pages 427-436
نویسندگان
Aaron Hatcher,