کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10475466 | 929155 | 2005 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
An efficient mechanism to control correlated externalities: redistributive transfers and the coexistence of regional and global pollution permit markets
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We examine joint tradable permit markets as a self-enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems. By “correlated” we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which simultaneously cause differentiated regional and global externalities (e.g. smog and global warming). By “self-enforcing” we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions. We find that joint domestic and international permit markets are Pareto efficient for a wide class of preferences.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management - Volume 49, Issue 1, January 2005, Pages 68-82
Journal: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management - Volume 49, Issue 1, January 2005, Pages 68-82
نویسندگان
Arthur J. Caplan, Emilson C.D. Silva,