Early warning, late response (again): The 2011 famine in Somalia

One of the main questions that emerge from a review of the 2011 Somalia Famine is why early warning information did not lead to early action in Somalia in 2010 and 2011. Despite the timely alerts and stark predictions released over a period of 11 months, insufficient measures were taken to prevent malnutrition, morbidity, mortality and livelihood stress. To help answer this question, this article takes a common framework for analyzing early warning failures and tests it against the actual experience of early warning and response in Somalia, including the content and communication of the early warning information, the institutional context of the early warning system, the broader political environment and the logistical obstacles to launching a timely and adequate response. This article concludes with a review of the implications of the systematic problems of late response to early warning, including the need to refocus early warning and support to communities and in-country institutions and systems (“providers of first resort”) and to clarify rights, resources, responsibilities and recourse within the international system of assistance providers (“providers of last resort”).

► We ask why early warning information failed to lead to early crisis risk management.
► Political factors and institutions weaknesses were barriers to early response.
► We offer directions for reform of humanitarian action in Somalia.
► We argue that “providers of last resort” cannot also be first responders.