کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10476257 | 929665 | 2005 | 22 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Hold-up, stakeholders and takeover threats
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
استراتژی و مدیریت استراتژیک
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
We analyze the impact of takeover threats on long-term relationships between the target owners and other stakeholders. In the absence of takeovers, stakeholders' bargaining power increases their incentive to invest but reduces the owners' incentive to invest. The threat of a takeover that would transfer value from the stakeholders reduces their ex ante investment. However, the stakeholders may appropriate ex post some value created by a takeover. This can prevent some value-enhancing takeovers. We examine extensions to the disciplinary role of takeovers, takeover defense mechanisms, and trade credit, and discuss empirical predictions.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Intermediation - Volume 14, Issue 3, July 2005, Pages 376-397
Journal: Journal of Financial Intermediation - Volume 14, Issue 3, July 2005, Pages 376-397
نویسندگان
Gilles Chemla,