کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10478770 | 931375 | 2005 | 28 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The dynamics of government
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We model income redistribution with dynamic distortions as determined by rational voting without commitment among individuals of different types and income realizations. We find that redistribution is too persistent relative to that chosen by a planner with commitment. The difference is larger, the lower is the political influence of young agents, the lower is the altruistic concern for future generations, and the lower is risk-aversion. Furthermore, there tends to be too much redistribution in the political equilibrium. Finally, smooth preference aggregation, as under probabilistic voting, produces less persistence and does not admit multiple equilibria, which occur under majority-voting aggregation.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Monetary Economics - Volume 52, Issue 7, October 2005, Pages 1331-1358
Journal: Journal of Monetary Economics - Volume 52, Issue 7, October 2005, Pages 1331-1358
نویسندگان
John Hassler, Per Krusell, Kjetil Storesletten, Fabrizio Zilibotti,