کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10479344 | 931666 | 2005 | 19 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Credible assignments can improve efficiency in laboratory public goods games
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper reports an experiment investigating how assignments improve economic efficiency in a modified version of the standard voluntary-contributions mechanism. The experiment uses a non-binding message that makes common information assignments in the repeated game. A credible assignment is one actually followed by the participants. It turns out to be difficult to credibly assign the symmetric efficient outcome in four person cohorts, but we did discover one assignment that was credible in the last match of the evolutionary repeated game.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 89, Issue 8, August 2005, Pages 1437-1455
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 89, Issue 8, August 2005, Pages 1437-1455
نویسندگان
Beth Seely, John Van Huyck, Raymond Battalio,