کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10479347 | 931666 | 2005 | 21 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining](/preview/png/10479347.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron-Ferejohn model), but this is determined by the selection protocol which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted in the closed rule Baron and Ferejohn model, as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game. Discounting pushes behavior in the direction predicted by Baron and Ferejohn but has a much smaller effect than predicted.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 89, Issue 8, August 2005, Pages 1497-1517
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 89, Issue 8, August 2005, Pages 1497-1517
نویسندگان
Guillaume Fréchette, John H. Kagel, Massimo Morelli,