کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10501790 | 945098 | 2005 | 17 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Who said politicians cannot be conservative? Comparing reform capacity in the Czech and Hungarian telecom administrations
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
علوم اجتماعی
توسعه
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
Hungary outpaced the Czech Republic in reforms of the telecom sector during the first decade of transition. In the Czech Republic, prices remained low, competition limited and the state maintained ownership of the incumbent operator. Hungary, in contrast, experienced extensive privatization, liberalization of prices and some deregulation. This outcome challenges the assumption that institutional veto points (frameworks that constrain or enable political agents) manipulated by conservative bureaucrats hindered the initiatives of reform minded politicians in Hungary, while allowing reforms to occur in the also reforming Czech Republic. It is shown that the Czech telecom administration had only a few possibilities to block policy decisions through veto points. The slow reform process was rather a result of a conscious political strategy of maintaining control and accommodating a conservative constituency in context of a relatively sound economic environment. In Hungary, bureaucrats acting as agents of change pushed though the reforms despite opposition from politicians. This insight challenges the traditional picture of civil servants in post-communist systems as inherently conservative and anti-reform.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Communist and Post-Communist Studies - Volume 38, Issue 3, September 2005, Pages 403-419
Journal: Communist and Post-Communist Studies - Volume 38, Issue 3, September 2005, Pages 403-419
نویسندگان
Ole Nørgaard, Luise Pape Møller,