Transferability of fishing rights: The Spanish case

Some authors defend the implementation of regulation mechanisms such as individual transferable quotas, that is, the capacity to assign every fisherman an individual right so that he can fish a certain quantity of a specific species during a concrete period of time, as the most efficient way to reach a greater resource assessment and to guarantee biological sustainability. Nevertheless, much attention has been brought to the fact that, since these rights can be sold, negotiated, exchanged or transferred by the owners, it can bring about a concentration process, which would not favour social equity.In Spain, fishing legislation has been moving progressively towards the implementation of individual transferable fishing rights with regard to industrial fishing in community waters, whereas it has also kept a more traditional access system regarding coastal fishing. Law 3/2002 sanctions this transferability of fishing rights, although it avoids making a statement on Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). In Europe, after the passing of the Reform of the Common Fishery Policy, the criteria to be developed in mechanisms in fishing management tend to favour ITQs, although no regulation guidelines exist yet.In this paper, the dynamics experienced by the Spanish fleet are highlighted and the mobility and volatility of fishing rights and their territorial consequences are analysed.