کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
11023476 | 1701284 | 2018 | 35 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Cheap-talk evaluations in contract design
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
ارزیابی ارزان قیمت در طراحی قرارداد
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
This study proposes ex-post cheap-talk evaluations as a potential behavioral force in contract designs. Specifically, in a one shot gift-exchange game between a firm and a worker, we experimentally investigate whether a worker's preference for avoiding (seeking) written expression of disapproval (approval) from the firm can induce higher effort from the worker and thereby improve efficiency. We find that, compared to the no-evaluation condition, free-form evaluation increases both effort and efficiency significantly while structured evaluation does not. To identify the channel through which free-form evaluation succeeds, we run additional treatments that allow the firm to communicate its desired effort beforehand. We find that free-form evaluation still achieves the highest level of actual effort while desired efforts are similar across evaluation protocols. If the firm's desired effort serves as a proxy for the firm's expected effort, then this suggests that free-form evaluation's success is due to the saliency of these messages in the worker's preference rather than the worker's belief of the firm's expectation.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics - Volume 77, December 2018, Pages 78-87
Journal: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics - Volume 77, December 2018, Pages 78-87
نویسندگان
Ninghua Du, Quazi Shahriar,