Irrealis: fact or fiction?

This paper discusses the nature of the category of reality status, or realis/irrealis. Although the terms realis and irrealis are widely used in the typological literature and in grammatical descriptions, there is much variation in how these terms are used. This variation means that the terms realis and irrealis are not easily comparable from one study to the next. The question then is: is there such a category as reality status? This question is looked at via an examination of various languages, grammatical domains and different frameworks. The conclusion is that we may not be able to posit a typologically valid category of reality status, but we may be able to approach the matter through a bottom-up method of examining individual languages and language families, both synchronically and diachronically.

► The category of reality status is not a typologically valid category.
► Any category sensitive to a reality status distinction can be realis or irrealis.
► A bottom-up semantic map approach would work best for investigating reality status.
► Reality status reflexes can be found in unexpected places, such as English will.