Le marché du travail cycliste comme économie des singularités

The regulation of sports job markets is often perceived to be the result of perfectly adjusted interaction between offer and demand, i.e. coherently calibrated between a sporting performance and a price for said performance. Based on a neoclassical economic theory, this type of approach has several limitations which this article hopes to overcome by proposing an analysis of the cycling job market in terms of the economics of singularities. To this end, the research questions the dynamics of the valorisation of cyclists' skills in this job market and the collective qualification procedures that employers use to spot, choose and contractually engage riders. The article shows that the mechanisms which allow employers to remove uncertainty about riders' singularities are based on formal and informal judgement devices and on trust devices. In this sense the results highlight the fact that market logics are also network logics which allow riders to showcase their abilities and gain recognition from employers. The article also underscores the fact that price setting is not based solely on the track record of the riders; it adjusts to the common convictions which form the basis of professional culture and work division.