کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
1160214 | 1490328 | 2015 | 6 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
• There is reason to doubt that scientists who are realists are more apt to advance the goals of science.
• The optimal research community may require a balance of realists and anti-realists.
• Support is drawn from examining the role of the Wittenberg astronomers in the Copernican Revolution.
I revisit an older defense of scientific realism, the methodological defense, a defense developed by both Popper and Feyerabend. The methodological defense of realism concerns the attitude of scientists, not philosophers of science. The methodological defense is as follows: a commitment to realism leads scientists to pursue the truth, which in turn is apt to put them in a better position to get at the truth. In contrast, anti-realists lack the tenacity required to develop a theory to its fullest. As a consequence, they are less likely to get at the truth.My aim is to show that the methodological defense is flawed. I argue that a commitment to realism does not always benefit science, and that there is reason to believe that a research community with both realists and anti-realists in it may be better suited to advancing science. A case study of the Copernican Revolution in astronomy supports this claim.
Journal: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A - Volume 54, December 2015, Pages 74–79