کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
1161213 | 1490428 | 2015 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
• We distinguish Bohr׳s doctrine of classical concepts from the quantum–classical transition.
• Bohr׳s doctrine of classical concepts is based on a functionalist epistemology of experiment.
• There is no conflict between Bohr׳s epistemology and decoherence theory in quantum mechanics.
Niels Bohr׳s doctrine of the primacy of “classical concepts” is arguably his most criticized and misunderstood view. We present a new, careful historical analysis that makes clear that Bohr׳s doctrine was primarily an epistemological thesis, derived from his understanding of the functional role of experiment. A hitherto largely overlooked disagreement between Bohr and Heisenberg about the movability of the “cut” between measuring apparatus and observed quantum system supports the view that, for Bohr, such a cut did not originate in dynamical (ontological) considerations, but rather in functional (epistemological) considerations. As such, both the motivation and the target of Bohr׳s doctrine of classical concepts are of a fundamentally different nature than what is understood as the dynamical problem of the quantum-to-classical transition. Our analysis suggests that, contrary to claims often found in the literature, Bohr׳s doctrine is not, and cannot be, at odds with proposed solutions to the dynamical problem of the quantum–classical transition that were pursued by several of Bohr׳s followers and culminated in the development of decoherence theory.
Journal: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics - Volume 49, February 2015, Pages 73–83